Vertical Merger Guidelines
Rivals’ Exit Should Be Incorporated into the Guidelines for Vertical Merger Evaluation
An exit-inducing vertical merger might reduce welfare even if it is a welfare-enhancing vertical merger absent exit. Therefore, the possibility for rivals’ exit should be incorporated into the guidelines for vertical merger evaluation, write Javier D. Donna and Pedro Pereira in new research.
Populism at the FTC Upsets the Antitrust Religion of Consumer Welfare: A Reply to Sokol and Wickelgren
Institutional change, on any fundamental level, will have those that seek to defend the status quo up in arms. But in order to effectively...
Populism at the FTC Undermines Antitrust Enforcement
The FTC plays an essential role in curbing illegal mergers and monopolies and increasing its enforcement is welcome. But to do so effectively, the...
The FTC Was Correct to Withdraw the Vertical Merger Guidelines
The 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines, now withdrawn by the FTC, did not represent sound merger policy, argues Steven Salop; rather, they were overly defendant-friendly...
Missing the Forest for the Trees: A Reply to Hovenkamp and Shapiro
The Federal Trade Commission’s now-abandoned 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines were not some ideal economic document that the FTC foolishly disregarded; rather, they failed spectacularly...
How Will the FTC Evaluate Vertical Mergers?
The Federal Trade Commission’s recent withdrawal of its 2020 vertical merger guidelines is flatly incorrect as a matter of microeconomic theory and is contrary...
