Should we pay regulators according to their performance? In a new paper, Jason Chen, Jakub Hajda, and Joseph Kalmenovitz show that a pay-for-performance system has a surprising effect: it increases regulatory effort but also motivates regulators, especially the productive ones, to quit and join the private sector.
How prolific is the revolving door issue at the federal level? In a new paper, Joseph Kalmenovitz, Siddharth Vij, and Kairong Xiao analyze the prevalence of revolving door behavior in the United States government and discuss the impacts of limiting private sector job prospects for regulators.
A new study finds that legislators who worked for interest groups before taking office influence the voting behavior of their colleagues when the motion...
In an interview with ProMarket, Sarah Chayes, author of the book On Corruption in America, discussed corruption in the US and how incoming administration...
Many fear that the potential for well-paid post-elective jobs can make legislators give rewards to their future employers. A new study finds that career...
ProMarket interviews Eric Ben-Artzi, the former Deutsche Bank risk officer turned whistleblower who rejected an $8.25 million award from the SEC.
In May 2015, Deutsche Bank...