Regulation

In new research, Luca Macedoni and Ariel Weinberger argue that large firms are more likely to lobby in favor of strict industry regulations when they can reduce competition by imposing high fixed costs on smaller, less-profitable firms.

In new research, Michele Fioretti and Alessandro Iaria discuss how a landmark Norwegian court ruling shows how constitutional constraints on the government’s ability to retroactively change contracts can encourage private innovation and reshape entire industries.

Chinese automotive manufacturers gain a competitive edge through laxer rules governing personal data protection and intellectual property. Oscar Borgogno and Giovanni Veronese argue that ensuring effective compliance with European law could help European manufacturers re-establish a level playing field while upholding EU constitutional values.

In new research, Yoan Hermstrüwer and David Imhof analyze how AI can help antitrust authorities predict cartels by assessing international bidding data in countries with similar legal and market structures.

In new research, Luis Armona and Adam Rosenberg argue that current state firearm excise taxes inadequately address gun-related crimes. They propose a tax that benefits society by targeting guns responsible for the most homicides, while accommodating the challenging political economy of firearms regulation in the United States.

In new research, Renuka Diwan, Paul Eliason, Riley League, Ryan C. McDevitt, James W. Roberts, and Jetson Leder-Luis investigate how Medicare’s shift to a competitive bidding system to reduce prices has inadvertently shifted market share to fraudulent suppliers.

In a forthcoming paper in the Yale Journal on Regulation, Stefan Bechtold, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Edoardo Martino, and Gideon Parchomovsky examine how smart contracts are transforming financial contracting by creating enforceable rights that bind third parties without the legal formalities property law has always required. This “property without law” phenomenon enhances financial efficiency while exposing the public to systemic risks beyond the reach of existing regulation.

In new research, Alexander Furnas, Timothy LaPira, and Clare Brock find that most politically active organizations engage in either campaign contributions or lobbying, but rarely both.The findings have implications for regulation and future academic research.

In new research, Jack Kappelman and Haotian Chen investigate how mass violence impacts legislative voting on firearm-related bills. They conclude that on average, state...

Congressional attempts to ban cryptocurrency platforms from providing yield, or interest, on stablecoin holdings have so far failed, and will likely continue to fail, as long as they run up against economic logic, writes David Krause.