Regulation

In a forthcoming paper in the Yale Journal on Regulation, Stefan Bechtold, Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Edoardo Martino, and Gideon Parchomovsky examine how smart contracts are transforming financial contracting by creating enforceable rights that bind third parties without the legal formalities property law has always required. This “property without law” phenomenon enhances financial efficiency while exposing the public to systemic risks beyond the reach of existing regulation.

In new research, Alexander Furnas, Timothy LaPira, and Clare Brock find that most politically active organizations engage in either campaign contributions or lobbying, but rarely both.The findings have implications for regulation and future academic research.

In new research, Jack Kappelman and Haotian Chen investigate how mass violence impacts legislative voting on firearm-related bills. They conclude that on average, state...

Congressional attempts to ban cryptocurrency platforms from providing yield, or interest, on stablecoin holdings have so far failed, and will likely continue to fail, as long as they run up against economic logic, writes David Krause.

In new research, Ben Bates examines the recent wave of funds designed to open private markets to retail investors. Such funds both underreport volatility and perform worse than comparable funds aimed at wealthier investors.

In new research providing the first systematic evidence on public notices, Kimberlyn Munevar, Anya Nakhmurina, and Delphine Samuels examine how Florida's 2023 law allowing local governments to stop publishing public notices in newspapers has affected citizen engagement in local governance.

In new research, Matthias Breuer and Qingkai Dong examine how federal data collection can influence local spending. They examine road surveys, showing that roads included in federal samples are more likely to be funded and those that are not often face funding and safety declines, reflecting a need for improved measurement systems.

In new research, Martin Schmalz and Jin Xie examine how shareholder preferences influence the United States pharmaceutical industry. They find that generic-drug manufacturers sometimes harm their firms’ own value when doing so benefits shareholder portfolios, who frequently have stakes in competing brand-name firms.

In new research, Sureyya Burcu Avci, Cindy Schipani, and H. Nejat Seyhun assess and justify the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s failed attempts to regulate potential fraud and deception in the private equity market by examining the performance and potential conflicts-of-interest in de-SPAC transactions.

In recent research, Christian Bergqvist argues that the European Union’s approach to wage-fixing, no-hire, and no-poach agreements reveals a lack of nuance that may end up harming competition.