The time has come for companies, economists, and society to abandon the argument that the only responsibility of business is to maximize profits.
Read more
Does Environmental Crime Pay?
A new Stigler Center working paper conducts a cost-benefit analysis of DuPont’s emissions of a toxic chemical dubbed C8.
Read more
To What Extent Do Political Considerations Affect Finance?
In June, the Stigler Center brought together top academics for a conference on the impact of politics on finance. Ahead of our second annual Political Economy of Finance conference, we are seeking papers related to the interaction between politics and business.
Read more
Turning Corporations into Democracies
The problem with encouraging firms to maximize shareholder welfare is how to prevent managers and special interests from diverting corporate resources in the name of shareholder welfare to causes that provide them, their family, or their friends with private benefits.
Read more
Let Data Guide Legislation: Stifling Shareholders in the CHOICE Act?
In improving the current shareholder proposal process, legislators should trade the butcher knife for the scalpel.
Read more
A Small Step for Theory, a Leap Forward in Corporate Governance
Moving from shareholder value maximization to shareholder welfare maximization may be a small step in theory, but it could trigger a leap forward in the way our corporations are run.
Read more
Where Friedman Was Wrong
A new paper by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales argues that a company’s objective should be the maximization of shareholders’ welfare, not value.
Read more
Eliot Spitzer: The U.S. Never Had the Will and the Ability to Hold the Most Powerful to Account
In a special interview with ProMarket, former New York governor Eliot Spitzer talks about financial regulation, regulatory capture, and antitrust. Part 1 of 2.
Read more
How Market Power Leads to Corporate Political Influence
Neoclassical economic theory assumes that firms have no power to influence the rules of the game. A new paper by Luigi Zingales argues: This is true only in competitive product markets. When firms have market power, they will seek and obtain political influence and vice versa.
Read more
Blockchains and Corporate Finance: “In a Blockchain Market, Shareholder Activists Might Play Much Less of a Role”
Will blockchain technology lead to less shareholder activism and higher executive compensation? Watch David Yermack’s full Stigler Center lecture on the potential implications of blockchain technology for the future of corporate governance. Second part of a three-part series.
Read more
Enhancing Competition? The Role of Governance in Increasing Exposure to Competition
Contemporary corporate governance reform has been a mixed bag: reforms that increase a company’s exposure to competition through the control market have been helpful, while reforms that empower special interest shareholders are a cause for concern. First part of a two-part series.
Read more
Does Whistleblowing Work?
Whistleblower reward laws work, and they work remarkably well. Congress, the executive branch of government, and the business community should enact, support, and nurture strong whistleblower reward programs.
Read more