big tech

The following is an excerpt from the book Digital Empires - The Global Battle to Regulate Technology by Anu Bradford, published by Oxford University Press and reprinted here by permission. Check out today's Stigler Center webinar with Bradford in conversation with Filippo Lancieri about her new book.

At the heart of the government’s lawsuit against Apple is if the tech company’s practices of tying and refusing to deal truly enhance the performance and security of the iPhone and its ancillary services. The complaint indicates that the outcome of the case will be determined by the consumer welfare standard, writes Herbert Hovenkamp.

The answer is both. How so? The recent antitrust complaint against Apple heralds a pivotal shift in understanding the influence of tech giants on innovation in the digital realm. This article highlights three key takeaways. 

Randy Picker reviews the context of the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple and the questions of merit and the competitive obligations of dominant firms driving the case.

Fiona Scott Morton provides her initial thoughts on the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple, how it compares to current and past tech cases, and the arguments she anticipates each side will make.

Drawing on new research, Oles Andriychuk identifies eight defining features of the European Union’s and United Kingdom’s new laws to regulate competition in digital markets that transform how we understand competition policy.

The European Commission has fined Apple for abusing its App Store. The Commission did not mention Spotify, but the fine appears to answer the music streaming platform’s complaint that Apple’s App Store fees to developers are too high. But now that Spotify has seen Apple’s new approach under Europe’s new Digital Markets Act, Spotify is still unhappy, highlighting the flaws of Spotify’s original complaint and the Commission’s fine, writes Randy Picker.

At the heart of the United States Google Search case is the monopolizing effect of Google securing for its own search offering the status of default search engine on a web browser, such as Safari, Chrome, or Firefox. The authors review the behavioral economics and empirical evidence of this effect and suggest several conduct and structural remedies to open up the search market to competition.

The following is an excerpt from Ignacio Cofone’s new book, “The Privacy Fallacy: Harm and Power in the Information Economy,” out now.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), designed to regulate Big Tech, supplements current antitrust laws that pursue case-by-case analyses of business conduct with general rules to block potentially anticompetitive behaviors. Detractors criticize the DMA for its lack of nuance. Supporters applaud its general principles as a necessary bulwark against Big Tech’s market powers, which current case-by-case analysis has been unable to rein in. However, neither side appreciates the true complexity of the DMA or how its principles interact to prevent anticompetitive behavior, writes Alba Ribera Martínez.