antitrust and competition

European Digital Platform Regulation Risks Undermining Itself with Over-Centralization

Recent European digital regulation surrenders traditional key guideposts of European competition law and policy. The over-centralization of European Union antitrust authority and EU legislation risks undermining member state laws and competences. This may privilege platforms and eventually harm competition and consumers, writes Jörg Hoffmann.

Brazil’s CADE Demonstrates How Antitrust Authorities Can Pursue Sustainability Goals

Antitrust scholars and authorities are debating how antitrust can and should align with green sustainability initiatives. A recent ruling from Brazil’s antitrust authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, in approving the launch of a commercial platform for agricultural commodity traders to track global supply chain sustainability metrics, presents one case study on how to advance sustainability goals without compromising competition.

Randy Picker: Understanding Firm Entry and the Internal Growth Presumption in the Draft Merger Guidelines

Randy Picker provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Firm Consolidations Hurt Workers, But Likely Not Because of Market Power

In new research, Sabien Dobbelaere, Grace McCormack, Daniel Prinz, and Sándor Sóvágó find that mergers negatively impact labor market outcomes. Mergers result in job losses, and the earnings of workers who lose their jobs don’t recover for several years on average. The authors find these negative consequences are more likely attributable to the restructuring of labor forces than subsequent firm market power.

Antitrust for the Platform Economy

Friso Bostoen’s new book, Abuse of Platform Power: Leveraging Conduct in Digital Markets under EU Competition Law and Beyond, outlines how antitrust agencies and policymakers should tackle market power in the platform economy. The following is an adaptation of the book’s introduction.

Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale: Vertical Merger Enforcement in the Draft Merger Guidelines

Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale provide their round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Labor Markets Are the New Frontier for Competition Policy

Do labor markets in Europe or the United States and Canada experience more monopsony power? In a new paper published in the University of Chicago Law Review, Satoshi Araki, Andrea Bassanini, Andrew Green, Luca Marcolin, and Cristina Volpin provide comparisons of monopsony power between the two regions, documenting similar levels of concentration across labor markets despite generally stronger protections in Europe. They also discuss the effects of such concentration on employment and wages, ending with potential regulatory reforms to address these issues.

Herbert Hovenkamp: Competitive Harm and the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines

Herbert Hovenkamp provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Announcing the ProMarket Merger Guidelines Symposium

In two rounds, 12 antitrust experts will provide their comments on the draft Merger Guidelines and respond to each other's comments. On July 19, the...

The Revised US Merger Guidelines Adopt the Future Markets Model

Since 1993 the American enforcers have claimed that they can directly protect firms’ competition to innovate. And the European Commission, which at first acknowledged that it protected competition in Future Markets, markets for products which do not exist yet, later claimed that it too can directly protect firms’ competition to innovate. In their new Revised Merger Guidelines the American enforcers now not only acknowledge that they protect competition in Future Markets, but say that they will do so aggressively. And since the Americans acknowledge that they protect competition in Future Markets the Europeans should do so as well—again.

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