antitrust and competition

Is there a world where AI developers could get the training data they need through content licensing deals? Matthew Sag argues that content licensing deals between developers of artificial intelligence and content owners are only possible for large content owners and cannot feasibly apply to the bulk of producers and owners of content on the internet.

Large AI firms like OpenAI and Amazon are licensing content to train their models that they might otherwise have been able to access for free under the fair use doctrine. Mark A. Lemley and Jacob Noti-Victor write that this behavior may constitute anticompetitive acquiescence—where large firms agree to license content they don’t have to in order to raise rivals’ costs.

Hannah Pittock uses weight-loss company Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera to create a three-prong framework by which the antitrust agencies can identify when an invitation to exclude a rival from a market constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Roslyn Layton examines the recent Amazon Web Services outage and compares it with last year’s CrowdStrike outage to illustrate differences in scope, responsibility, and systemic impact. She argues that cloud providers should contribute to the Universal Service Fund, ensuring financial contribution to resilience and critical infrastructure for essential services.

Nick Jacobson compares European and American enforcement to opening up the app store on Apple mobile phones, why European consumers and businesses are at an advantage, and if this advantage indicates that it is time for the United States to adopt legislation akin to the European Union’s Digital Markets Act.

Victor Oliveira Fernandes analyzes the contributions to digital market regulation presented in Brazil’s Fair Competition Act for Digital Markets. The proposed act reflects a careful balance between antitrust orthodoxy and innovation and, in its success or failure, will pave the way for additional digital regulation in the Global South.

Steve Salop explores the anticompetitive innovation behind weight-loss giant Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera. Novo’s proposed contract presents a new tactic by which firms with market power can preclude rival mergers that will lead to procompetitive entry.

The Google Search monopoly case focused on how Google’s agreements with Apple to set Google Search as the exclusive default search engine on Apple’s mobile devices allowed Google to solidify its monopoly in internet search. However, a less-explored dimension of these agreements is how they likewise fortified Apple’s monopoly power in the smartphone market, writes Steven C. Salop.

Beatriz Kira argues that Brazil’s proposed digital competition bill shows how the Global South can strengthen regulation of Big Tech platforms without forfeiting competitiveness. Brazil’s efforts build on global models yet chart their own course and belie the false dichotomy between encouraging national business development and protecting competition and its benefits.

Laura Phillips-Sawyer writes that history shows that antitrust and industrial policy have often served as complements to one another. Industrial policy has succeeded when it has targeted specific industries to invest in their ability to compete, rather than protect them from competition.