The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted its annual antitrust and competition conference in late April. The following is a transcript of the Judges Frank Easterbrook and Diane Wood's keynote conversation with Stigler Center Fellow Filippo Lancieri.
Most mergers in industries with only a handful of competitors are anticompetitive, so why don’t we block them? The fix is to use a structural presumption to lower the burden for regulators.
Why ban competitive offers in the online world when they’re allowed offline? Big tech wants plain vanilla broadband pricing because it forecloses platform competition.
Daryl Lim explains that while there is some evidence that pricing algorithms facilitate collusion, there are reasons to be skeptical of their effectiveness. Lim advocates for compliance by design: firms should create algorithms that don’t collude on price, comply with reporting their algorithms transparently, and know that they will be held responsible for the actions the algorithm takes.
The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted its annual antitrust and competition conference in late April. The following is a transcript of Nobel Laureate Oliver Hart's interview with ProMarket Managing Editor Brooke Fox.
Grail and its competitors are developing tests which will save perhaps millions of lives. They will detect many different types of cancer very early—if they ever exist. All these tests need Illumina’s instruments. The FTC, reversing an administrative law judge, said Illumina could not buy Grail. If it did, the FTC said, it would not let Grail’s competitors use its instruments. Illumina has appealed, saying, among other things, that since the tests do not exist there is, for antitrust purposes, currently no market. Yet while the tests may or may not exist in the future the Fifth Circuit has to decide this case now.
Companies increasingly use sophisticated computational tools to compete, particularly in digital markets. Giovanna Massarotto outlines how antitrust agencies must similarly modernize and adopt advanced technologies to address complex antitrust enforcement challenges effectively and remain relevant.
Drawing on the theory of Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Brian Callaci argues non-compete clauses stifle the important channels of communication between employees and businesses necessary for improving firm competitiveness. The evidence also shows that, despite claims from businesses, non-competes harm rather than reward employees for their loyalty.
Cary Coglianese lays out the potential, and the considerations, for antitrust regulators to use machine learning and artificial intelligence algorithms.
Brooke Fox and Walter Frick analyze research and ideas presented at the Stigler Center Antitrust and Competition Conference that question the value of mergers.