antitrust and competition

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko departed from the legal principles regulating refusals to deal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The 2004 Supreme Court opinion also embedded an ideological preference for non-intervention that has spread to other areas of antitrust law, eroding its ability to deter anticompetitive conduct. On its own terms, however, there are opportunities to distinguish and constrain Trinko, writes Andrew I. Gavil.

Eric Posner provides his thoughts on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Michal Gal discusses the regulatory hurdles to deal with the impacts of algorithmic price collusion. In the meantime, she says, market fixes include algorithmic consumers and platform nudges to mitigate price coordination.

The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted its annual antitrust and competition conference in late April. The following is a transcript of the Tim Wu's keynote in conversation with Binyamin Appelbaum of The New York Times.

Without saying how, FTC Commissioner Slaughter says competition authorities should do more than just protect competition in pipeline products; they should protect broader competition...

Axel Gautier, Ashwin Ittoo, and Pieter van Cleynenbreugel write that the practice of pricing algorithms tacitly colluding remains theoretical for now, and technological obstacles render it very unlikely in the short term. However, regulators must still prepare for a future in which artificial intelligence achieves the necessary sophistication to collude.

The Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State hosted its annual antitrust and competition conference in late April. The following is a transcript of the Susan Athey's keynote in conversation with Tommaso Valletti.

Oliver Budzinski and Victoriia Noskova discuss in their publication why merger simulations are not more widely used by competition authorities and in front of the courts to predict future effects of mergers despite advancements in availability of data, AI and computational power. The institutional setting is an essential factor for computational antitrust tools to be accepted and applied by competition authorities.

Are the antitrust enforcement agencies in the United States sufficiently stringent in challenging mergers? In a new working paper, Vivek Bhattacharya, Gastón Illanes, and David Stillerman inform this debate by examining the price and quantity effects of U.S. retail mergers and modeling the implications of alternative antitrust regimes.

American antitrust regulators have recently taken aim at noncompete clauses. They argue that noncompetes suppress labor bargaining power and thus wages. The Italian labor market differs from its American counterpart in its rigid protections for labor, but the use of noncompetes in Italy occur at about the same rate as in the United States and shows a correlation with lower wages for workers whose noncompete clauses are unjustified because their jobs require little training and do not grant access to trade secrets. The evidence from Italy suggests that better regulation of noncompetes and informing workers of their rights is justified on the whole.