antitrust and competition

New research from Christopher Stewart, John Kepler, and Charles McClure shows that thousands of large mergers and acquisitions bypass antitrust review because current regulatory thresholds ignore intangible assets like intellectual property and customer data. These unreported deals, particularly in tech and pharma sectors, show signs of being more anticompetitive - with higher premiums paid, increased market power for acquirers, and evidence of "killer acquisitions" in pharmaceuticals.

Despite fundamental changes in the real economy, and strides in the regulation of privacy, data, and digital markets, antitrust practice and discourse in Europe are still conducted in “safe spaces” where the antitrust community resists change and remains attached to neoliberal approaches and efficiency goals. But the Trump Administration will not just signify a wholesale return to pre-NeoBrandeisian times (as many in Europe hope): indeed Europeans hiding in their “safe spaces” may well be surprised, writes Cristina Caffarra.

Ecosystem analysis has been a popular but ill-defined concept in antitrust to identify digital products and services that operate across multiple markets. In new research, Konstantinos Stylianou and Bruno Carballa-Smichowski provide a schematic for defining ecosystems to help courts and regulators pursue more sophisticated investigations and interventions into increasingly complicated markets.

In Europe, many regulatory authorities are debating whether to loosen regulations on tech companies so that they can catch up with their counterparts in the United States and close Europe’s innovation gap. Based on her recent article, Anu Bradford shows that this choice is a false one. She argues that rather than stringent regulation, the gap in tech innovation between the U.S. and EU can be explained by differences in their scaling opportunities, capital markets, bankruptcy laws, immigration policy, and flexibility of their labor markets.

After several decades of obscurity, antitrust reemerged as a fashionable force in the second and third decades of the 21st century. This trend coincided with growing societal distrust of expertise. Barak Orbach explores assertions that corruption and greed drive support for lax antitrust enforcement policies, and that trustbusting zeal is a marker of intellectual integrity. He argues that intellectual integrity and sound public policy require the moderate, technocratic approaches that society heavily discounts.

Some American policymakers have sought to adopt and adapt aspects and principles of the European Union’s Digital Markets Act in an effort to regulate Big Tech giants. In new research, Giovanna Massarotto writes that the principle ideologies driving American and European antitrust, and the broader political economy, renders the DMA and its principles too foreign for American adoption.

Andrew Gavil examines the Biden Administration's antitrust policy, placing it in the broader historical context of evolving competition law. He questions the fit of Kuhn’s concept of paradigm shift for antitrust policy and argues instead that Biden's initiatives reflect the unique demands of the digital economy and the true nature of antitrust, which is ever evolving.

Randy Stutz writes that the Biden administration has recalibrated antirust policy by devoting more equal enforcement attention to competition in buyers’ markets and sellers’ markets, thereby promoting the welfare of both suppliers and consumers. The shift raises questions about whether courts should engage in “multi-market balancing”—the weighing of harms in one market against benefits in a different market—when the interests of suppliers and consumers diverge.

In a new paper, Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner argue that although cost-benefit analysis and originalism seem to belong to different legal worlds, they share a common political history of support from many of the same business interests. In recent years, both have gained wide acceptance across the political spectrum. But the ground may be shifting beneath them, and they now face uncertain futures.

Tim Brennan finds the new shift in antitrust thought and enforcement connected to the Neo-Brandeisian movement to be flawed for the most part. However, he writes that a reinvigorated focus on tacit collusion, which some have blamed on the rise of prices for groceries and apartment rents, may deserve consideration and further study.