The current law and economics framework of corporate law rests on four theoretical underpinnings that restrict students’ and regulators’ understanding of the stakes of corporate law. In new research, Mariana Pargendler argues that creating corporate laws that are more attuned to social welfare will require deprogramming its dominant framework.

In recent research, Johnathan S. Hartley and Morris K. Kleiner find that occupational licensing is globally pervasive among both developed and developing nations. However, higher national licensing rates are associated with lower GDP per capita, larger informal sectors, and weaker governance scores.

The following is an excerpt from Pentagon Capitalism: How the Cold War US Military Modeled Itself on Private Business by A. J. Murphy, now out at Harvard University Press.

In new research, Ben Bates examines the recent wave of funds designed to open private markets to retail investors. Such funds both underreport volatility and perform worse than comparable funds aimed at wealthier investors.

The dynamic competition school claims that competition authorities, by analyzing firms’ capabilities, can protect what this school calls dynamic competition.  Competition authorities, however, cannot adequately analyze firms’ capabilities. This school, therefore, lacks any framework which the authorities can use to analyze what they call dynamic competition. Any framework to protect dynamic competition, or what some call competition to innovate, must instead first identify the future products the competing firms are trying to make, writes Larry Landman.

Matt Lucky reviews Daron Acemoglu’s “What Happened to Liberal Democracy?: Remaking a Politics of Shared Prosperity,” now out at Penguin Press.