In new research, Patrice Bougette, Frédéric Marty, and Simone Vannuccini propose that competition authorities add a conditional fine to antitrust cases that is activated when behavioral remedies are no longer effective.

The following is an excerpt from Seeing Like a Supply Chain by Miriam Posner, now out at Yale University Press.

As banks grow, tiered regulation places them in stricter categories to address their greater risks. In new research, Pedro M. Batista finds that transition periods between tiers might delay when some higher standards become mandatory, potentially leaving growing banks exposed while known risks remain unresolved, as happened with Silicon Valley Bank. Federal Reserve reforms should address this gap between growing risks and delayed safeguards.

Matt Lucky reviews Mariana Mazzucato’s new book The Common Good Economy: A new compass, now out at Basic Venture Group.

Prizewinning research in most science-related academic fields has become less concentrated among institutions. However, as Richard B. Freeman, Danxia Xie, Hanzhe Zhang, and Hanzhang Zhou discuss in new research, prizewinners in economics continue to come from a narrow set of American institutions.  

For decades antitrust agencies, courts, and scholars have debated whether Section 7 of the Clayton Act permits an efficiency defense, in which merging firms can argue that enhanced efficiencies from the merger show that it does not reduce competition. However, the Supreme Court’s recent establishment of the “major questions doctrine,” which enforces or re-enforces a textualist reading of regulatory statues, undermines proponents of the efficiency defense, because the Clayton Act does not clearly and explicitly contain an efficiency defense. The “major questions doctrine” essentially acts as textualism on steroids,” writes Robert H. Lande.