Erik Peinert explores the paradoxical relationship between economic concentration and democracy, where economic concentration compromises the democratic process and democratic backsliding also gains momentum by taking advantage of concentrated market actors, whose political power is now impotent, to capture civil society.
Recent years have witnessed a significant wave of initiatives aimed at expanding antitrust’s substantive reach and reinvigorating enforcement, both to counter decades of weakened enforcement and to address contemporary economic realities. These efforts have coincided with calls to “democratize” antitrust by engaging the public in policymaking. Barak Orbach argues that such “democratized antitrust” is impractical, but boundary-pushing dynamics are central to the evolution of antitrust. He offers a conceptual guide for antitrust boundary pushing.
Gerhard Schick discusses the CumEx and CumCum share-trading scandals that cost German taxpayers billions of euros over the course of several decades and the failures in political and social institutions that allowed these scandals to persist for so long.
Former Federal Trade Commissioner and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Rohit Chopra writes that as the federal government circumvents the rule of law by pardoning corporate infractions and crimes in exchange for political favors, individual states, citizens, and businesses will need to pursue private actions against corporate wrongdoing.
Max von Thun and Claire Lavin argue that the European Commission must revise its merger guidelines to emphasize how competition policy can protect goals beyond prices, including innovation, security, and democracy. This will create a more prosperous European Union.
In new research, Tomaso Duso, Joseph Harrington, Carl Kreuzberg, and Geza Sapi demonstrate how their screening tool can aid antitrust authorities in identifying potential collusion between firms through public communications.
Kleptocracy is often thought to plague developing countries, but this grand corruption would be infeasible without the West’s financial and legal plumbing to launder misbegotten gains. American and European government initiatives to remedy their complicity have run aground or even reversed course, particularly in the United States under the new Trump administration, writes Alexander Cooley.
In new research, Adam Callister, Andrew Granato, and Belisa Pang argue that differing incentives faced by plaintiffs and defendants in “battles of the experts” litigation (like securities suits) leads to structurally higher spending by defendants on expert witnesses. These incentives also apply to any class action suit and many individual suits. They argue that courts should take this dynamic into account and correspondingly be more aggressive in using authority to employ court-appointed experts.