As a goal of antitrust, the consumer welfare standard has borne unfair attacks, which we refuted in a previous article. In this second article, we explain how the consumer welfare standard, understood as a method rather than as a set of goals, enables antitrust authorities and courts to navigate the inherent ambiguities of the competitive process and facilitate procompetitive outcomes.
In new research, Seong Jin Ahn, Jared N. Jennings, and Yanrong Jia find that SEC enforcement against insider trading does not deter subsequent insider trading so much as displace it to other actors in the same industry.
Large digital platforms have evolved into vast multimarket/multiproduct conglomerates, both organically and through a decade-long acquisition spree. Conduct and mergers can no longer be evaluated “market-by-market.” Yet the antitrust assessment of these “ecosystems” is still in its infancy, and regulators seeking to explore harm arising from the control of multiple assets and capabilities are falling back on traditional theories of harm that are more likely to resonate with judges. Substantive progress is unlikely to emerge spontaneously from consultants or academia, and regulators will need to harness interest in this space by motivating and coordinating relevant policy research, argues Cristina Caffarra.
In new research, Christian Peukert and Margaritha Windisch review how copyright laws and practices have evolved to adapt to new technologies and discuss the various issues scholars and policymakers must address as copyright law is once again forced to adapt to the emergence of artificial intelligence.
In new research, Matthias Breuer, Anthony Le, and Felix Vetter find that when companies are required by the government to seek a third-party financial audit, they turn to lower quality auditors. As a result, the accounting industry grows, but touted benefits for markets and corporate stakeholders appear elusive.
Much of the conversation of the proposed Kroger-Albertsons merger has focused on the risks to consumers. However, the merger also poses serious implications for the grocers’ upstream suppliers, particularly smaller regional firms.
Due to a change in how the FDIC resolves failed banks, uninsured deposits have become de facto insured. Not only is this dangerous for risk in the banking system, it is not what Congress intends the FDIC to do, writes Michael Ohlrogge.
Steven C. Salop argues that Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the acquiring firm’s unilateral incentives and business strategy are likely to lessen market competition.
Former special assistant to the president for technology and competition policy Tim Wu responds to the November 27 letter signed by former chief economists at the Federal Trade Commission and Justice Department Antitrust Division calling for a separation of the legal and economic analysis in the draft Merger Guidelines.
Kroger and Albertsons say they need to merge to compete with Walmart. Claire Kelloway argues that what they really want is Walmart’s monopsony power, and permitting mergers on these grounds will only harm suppliers, workers, and consumers.