Antitrust and Competition

Firms Sharing Board Members Can Collude To Reduce Worker Mobility

In new research, Taylor Begley, Peter Haslag, and Daniel Weagley find that when firms begin sharing a common director, there is a significant reduction in the number of employees that switch jobs between the two companies. The reduction is largest when the firms compete in the same labor market and for those employees who are most costly for firms to replace. The results show the link between overlapping board members and anticompetitive labor practices is a surprisingly widespread phenomenon.

Antitrust Needs To Draw on Computer Science To Detect Algorithmic Collusion

In new research, Giovanna Massarotto explains how collusion manifests differently in the digital economy. She argues that antitrust regulators, scholars, and courts need to incorporate lessons from computer science to update how they monitor markets and identify algorithmic collusion.

How Stricter Merger Guidelines Benefit Workers

Stricter merger policy guidelines will increase competition, leading to higher wages and welfare for workers, writes Kyle Herkenhoff and Simon Mongey. The authors use economic modeling to show that the stricter 2023 Guidelines will improve worker welfare, and that even tighter thresholds can be applied to labor markets to amplify worker welfare gains from antitrust policy.

Antitrust Scholarship Must Start Taking Predictability Seriously

Academic writings on the optimal design of antitrust rules fail to pay sufficient attention to enforcement predictability as a relevant factor. In new research, Jan Broulík analyzes the various ways in which predictability is disregarded and their possible underlying reasons.

Epic v. Google Offers Courts Chance To Correct Course on “Right To Repair”

Following the Federal Trade Commission’s 2021 publication of “Nixing the Fix: An FTC Report to Congress on Repair Restrictions,” private “right to repair” cases have multiplied against companies that leverage their market power in a “primary equipment market” (e.g., tractors) to force their customers also to purchase their offerings in “aftermarkets” (e.g., tractor repairs) that otherwise would be competitive. Daniel McCuaig argues that the application of the 1992 Supreme Court decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc. to these cases misunderstands that case and improperly shields monopolists from competitive pressures, including in Epic’s recent case against Apple.

The Privacy Fallacy

The following is an excerpt from Ignacio Cofone’s new book, “The Privacy Fallacy: Harm and Power in the Information Economy,” out now.

The 2023 Merger Guidelines Strengthen Enforcement by Finding Common Ground

Jonathan B. Baker provides his reactions to the final 2023 Merger Guidelines, including why they strengthen enforcement and where the antitrust enforcement agencies can further clarify their merger analysis.

The Digital Markets Act Is More Intricate Than Regulators and Detractors Give It Credit For

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA), designed to regulate Big Tech, supplements current antitrust laws that pursue case-by-case analyses of business conduct with general rules to block potentially anticompetitive behaviors. Detractors criticize the DMA for its lack of nuance. Supporters applaud its general principles as a necessary bulwark against Big Tech’s market powers, which current case-by-case analysis has been unable to rein in. However, neither side appreciates the true complexity of the DMA or how its principles interact to prevent anticompetitive behavior, writes Alba Ribera Martínez.

The Trends and Cases That Will Define US Antitrust in 2024

All eyes are on labor this year. Hiba Hafiz, Boston College: 2023 was a big year for labor antitrust. We saw the rise and fall of...

The Trends and Cases That Will Define European Antitrust in 2024

Four experts on antitrust in Europe discuss the trends and cases they're watching in 2024.

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