The Role of the State

Xavier Vives argues that to create firms that can compete on the international level, the European Union does not need to ease its merger regime or encourage market power. Rather, encouraging European market integration will allow firms to draw in investment and scale up their operations.

Ariel Ezrachi warns about the rising trend of political instrumentalization of antitrust and competition enforcement and its consequences.

Diana L. Moss reviews the increasing politicization of antitrust and regulation in the United States and what avenues are available to resist the corruption of due process and usurpation of the rule of law.

Drawing on her working paper, Giovanna Massarotto discusses three algorithmic approaches to how Google can fairly and efficiently share its data with rivals per the requirements of a court’s mandated remedy for illegally monopolizing the online search market.

Many studies have assumed that United States tariff costs are passed onto consumers. In new research, Vanessa Alviarez, Michele Fioretti, Ken Kikkawa, and Monica Morlacco argue that buyer-seller relationship dynamics allow dominant U.S. importers to instead force higher costs onto exporters.

States are beginning to impose idiosyncratic rules on artificial intelligence chatbots and other offerings in response to harms to consumers. Rather than create a...

Elizabeth Pollman reviews barriers for holding corporations and their fiduciaries accountable under corporate and securities law.

Judge Amit Mehta shaped his remedies in the Google Search case on the assumption that startups developing generative artificial intelligence models can restore competition in internet search. Mihir Kshirsagar analyzes the barriers to entry these startups face—scale, distribution, defaults, data and integration advantages, and content access—to show how Big Tech is still in control of the future of the search industry.

Chris Sagers suggests that something significant could be happening in antitrust, though it probably remains academic for now, and it is hidden behind political messaging that in recent times has gotten most of the attention. He argues that the populist or politicizing talk of antitrust leaders during both the present administration and the last one has grown more detached from real-world administration. But he argues that there may be real change going on behind the scenes, as expressed in positions among some conservatives and Republican office-holders. He argues that the libertarian orthodoxy of the Chicago School no longer defines “conservative” antitrust, and that the range of plausible disagreement may genuinely be changing.

The policies of conservative antitrust laid out by the new antitrust enforcers suggest a continued focus on the welfare of consumers and workers. This suggests a continued role for economics in shaping and advancing antitrust policy. However, Aviv Nevo writes, it is not clear from the actual actions taken by the antitrust agencies that economics, rather than political considerations, will be guiding antitrust policy.