Chris Sagers suggests that something significant could be happening in antitrust, though it probably remains academic for now, and it is hidden behind political messaging that in recent times has gotten most of the attention. He argues that the populist or politicizing talk of antitrust leaders during both the present administration and the last one has grown more detached from real-world administration. But he argues that there may be real change going on behind the scenes, as expressed in positions among some conservatives and Republican office-holders. He argues that the libertarian orthodoxy of the Chicago School no longer defines “conservative” antitrust, and that the range of plausible disagreement may genuinely be changing.
The policies of conservative antitrust laid out by the new antitrust enforcers suggest a continued focus on the welfare of consumers and workers. This suggests a continued role for economics in shaping and advancing antitrust policy. However, Aviv Nevo writes, it is not clear from the actual actions taken by the antitrust agencies that economics, rather than political considerations, will be guiding antitrust policy.
Gus Hurwitz explores the tenets of conservative antitrust under the second Trump administration and why it is unlikely to establish a lasting influence.
Thomas A. Lambert argues that the conservative antitrust program articulated by the antitrust enforcers of the Second Trump administration hardly resembles the conservative antitrust of previous decades. Its divergences will likely end up harming consumers.
Rebecca Haw Allensworth writes that the hallmark of the new conservative antitrust is not economic populism but silencing speech that the Trump administration ideologically opposes.
The European Commission has struggled to tackle excessive prices in Europe, despite evidence of how they arise in relation to market power. Aline Blankertz, Todd Davies, Justine Haekens, and Nicholas Shaxson argue that adopting accounting and financial analysis as part of its toolkit can enable the Commission to understand and act when firms are exploiting their market power.
Reed Showalter argues that the suggestion that antitrust can be ringfenced from democracy or the democratic process is erroneous. Antitrust is fundamentally a body...
Yunsieg P. Kim argues that economic regulation, including antitrust, can only be democratic if it is the choice of well-informed citizens.
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Erik Peinert explores the paradoxical relationship between economic concentration and democracy, where economic concentration compromises the democratic process and democratic backsliding also gains momentum by taking advantage of concentrated market actors, whose political power is now impotent, to capture civil society.