The Equitable Economy

In new research, Alejandro Herrera-Caicedo, Jessica Jeffers, and Elena Prager find that firms that share a C-suite executive or board director are much more...

Antitrust authorities increasingly assess mergers through the lens of innovation, particularly in research-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals. In new research, Carmine Ornaghi and Lorenzo Cassi show how mergers disrupt human capital and reduce innovation in what they call manslaughter acquisitions.

In new research, Ben Bates examines the recent wave of funds designed to open private markets to retail investors. Such funds both underreport volatility and perform worse than comparable funds aimed at wealthier investors.

In recent research, Pablo Balán, Agustín Vallejo, and Pablo M. Pinto examine how diversity affects cooperation between neighbors after a natural disaster. They find that more diverse neighborhoods were less likely to cooperate with each other on recovery efforts after Hurricane Harvey.

In new research, Michele Fioretti, Victor Saint-Jean, and Simon Smith show that NGO activism follows a clear economic logic: when NGOs lack visibility, stakeholders do not view them as credible, forcing them to rely on high-profile campaigns during annual shareholder meetings. However, these actions generate attention but rarely influence decisions. As NGOs gain recognition, they can campaign earlier, when votes are still open, and meaningfully sway shareholders and change corporate behavior.

In new research exploiting state-level changes in non-compete enforceability, Kate Reinmuth and Emma Rockall find that stronger non-competes have historically reduced innovation in the United States. These declines are driven by sharp drops in inventor mobility and knowledge spillovers, especially in young, high-growth sectors.

In new research, Martin Schmalz and Jin Xie examine how shareholder preferences influence the United States pharmaceutical industry. They find that generic-drug manufacturers sometimes harm their firms’ own value when doing so benefits shareholder portfolios, who frequently have stakes in competing brand-name firms.

In new research, Anat R. Admati, Nate Atkinson, and Paul Pfleiderer argue that when misconduct is profitable, enforcement mechanisms aimed at deterring corporate misconduct often fail to achieve their goals and they may even backfire. The reason is that corporations can adjust internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial compensation, to reduce or nullify the deterrent effects of corporate or managerial sanctions. These responses may lead to more misconduct and exacerbate social harm.

Matt Lucky reviews Dani Rodrik’s new book, “Shared Prosperity in a Fractured World: A New Economics for the Middle Class, the Global Poor, and Our Climate”

In new research, Mario Amore, Morten Bennedsen, Birthe Larsen, and Zeyu Zhao examine the symbiotic relationship between working environments and employee well-being, finding that when workers are safe and satisfied, companies profit.