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Regulatory Capture

When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.
“… as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler – The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)

Money in Politics

How Do Members of Congress React to the Potential of Lucrative Private Sector Employment?

Benjamin C.K. Egerod
Many fear that the potential for well-paid post-elective jobs can make legislators give rewards to their future employers. A new study finds that career...
Antitrust and Competition

“We Were Naïve,” Says FCC Chair Who Oversaw the Creation of Section 230

Guy Rolnik
In an interview with ProMarket, former FCC chair Reed Hundt spoke about antitrust, Big Tech platforms, the future of the 1996 provision that provided legal protection...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Over 60 Leading Finance Economists Ask SEC to Revise the Shareholder Voting Draft Reform

ProMarket writers
The new regulation that Security and Exchange Commissioners voted in November doesn't fix proxy advisory industry duopoly problems, but it actually makes them worse:...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

New Rules on Shareholder Voting Debate: Best Readers' Comment

James McRitchie
The draft SEC regulation on shareholder proposal and proxy advisory firms will curb the initiative of individual shareholders to improve corporate governance and transparency...
ESG, Corporate Governance & Future of the Firm

Why the US Government Buys Overpriced Services From McKinsey

Matt Stoller
The Industrial Funding Fee pays $3 million a year for a 23-year old McKinsey employee instead of hiring an experienced person directly to do...
Antitrust and Competition

The Rise of the Opioids: How Purdue Invented New Markets for OxyContin

David Egilman, Gregory Collins, Julie Falender, Naomi Shembo, Ciara Keegan, Sunil Tohan
Purdue's strategy was to market its opioids directly to patients via brochures, videos, advertisements, and the internet. It also provided information to doctors and...
Regulatory Capture

Who Benefits When State Governments Award Incentives to Politically-Connected Companies?

Allison Koester
A new study finds that a company is nearly four times more likely to receive an economic incentive in a state where the company...
Academic Capture

Purdue Circumvented the Regulator to Promote OxyContin, Hiding Its Real Risk of Addiction

David Egilman, Gregory Collins, Julie Falender, Naomi Shembo, Ciara Keegan, Sunil Tohan
In 2001, the Food and Drug Administration required Purdue to change OxyContin’s patient package inserts to make addiction risks more evident. The company altered...
Academic Capture

“The Question Is Whether We Live in a Democracy or a Corporate State”

Asher Schechter
In an interview with ProMarket, Goliath author Matt Stoller discusses the political choices that led to the downfall of the American antimonopoly movement and the “addiction to...
Antitrust and Competition

"You Can Put the Monopoly Tiger in a Cage but You Cannot Transform a Tiger Into a Vegan"

Christoph Gisiger
In an extensive interview with the Swiss news website TheMarket.ch, Luigi Zingales discusses ways to deal with Big Tech and the impact of the...
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The publication of the Stigler Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

ProMarket is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests. The posts represent the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty. For more information, please visit ProMarket Policy.