Series

Tim Brennan finds the new shift in antitrust thought and enforcement connected to the Neo-Brandeisian movement to be flawed for the most part. However, he writes that a reinvigorated focus on tacit collusion, which some have blamed on the rise of prices for groceries and apartment rents, may deserve consideration and further study.

Eleanor Fox writes that the paradigm shift in United States antitrust is not best understood as an embrace of neo-Brandeisian anti-bigness ideas but rather a rejection of neoliberal principles that have prevented effective antitrust regulation for decades. The shift encompasses the concerns and efforts of centrists, progressives, and neo-Brandeisians.

John W. Mayo reviews whether or not the articulated principles and priorities of the Neo-Brandeisian movement in antitrust scholarship and enforcement represent a “paradigm shift,” per the philosophy of Thomas Kuhn. Mayo finds that the Neo-Brandeisian discourse is best understood as situated within the continuum of the current antitrust paradigm, and that many of its efforts to substantiate its distinctive ideas have failed to properly ground them in empiricism or repudiate existing studies.

Both Donald Trump and Kamala Harris have proposed policies that encourage the redistribution of resources rather than maximizing efficiencies to grow the economic pie. Jeffrey Miron and Constantin Wells argue these preferences will harm the American economy and voters in the long term.

Stacey Dogan writes that antitrust regulators in the United States and Europe are right to investigate Big Tech-AI partnerships. Even if AI markets remain competitive today, history and economics show that the Big Tech companies will push to monopolize segments of the AI market if given the opportunity. The investigations serve as a deterrent against anticompetitive behavior and give the regulators access to the knowledge and information that will be necessary to detect anticompetitive patterns as the AI market matures.

Adam Crews writes that Congress’s expressly broad grants of rulemaking power mean that the Supreme Court’s Loper Bright decision limiting federal agencies’ discretion will likely affect the Federal Communications Commission less than some other federal agencies. Instead, the major questions and nondelegation doctrines pose greater threats to the FCC’s regulatory discretion.

Many cities across the United States are experiencing structural budget deficits. However, in part due to salary and benefit promises to public-employee unions, there is little capacity to control spending. Local politicians have few electoral incentives to push back against union bargaining demands to address these rising costs.

Municipal and state governments provide input to the organization that creates their accounting standards. Such input by stakeholders can be helpful, but their influence has produced some accounting rules that diverge from both economic reality and private sector rules. These deviations allow governments to understate budget liabilities, including pensions plans, and put at risk the financial health of states and cities across the United States.

In contrast to a recent paper that argues the decline in antitrust enforcement over recent decades is due largely to the political influence of big business, Herbert Hovenkamp argues that small businesses and trade associations have historically had more influence over antitrust policy, often lobbying for less competition and higher prices.

Simonetta Vezzoso weighs in on the policy debate on algorithmic competition.