Research

How Stronger Non-Compete Agreements Slow Innovation

In new research exploiting state-level changes in non-compete enforceability, Kate Reinmuth and Emma Rockall find that stronger non-competes have historically reduced innovation in the United States. These declines are driven by sharp drops in inventor mobility and knowledge spillovers, especially in young, high-growth sectors.

Common Ownership May Reduce the Entry of Cheaper Generic Drugs

In new research, Martin Schmalz and Jin Xie examine how shareholder preferences influence the United States pharmaceutical industry. They find that generic-drug manufacturers sometimes harm their firms’ own value when doing so benefits shareholder portfolios, who frequently have stakes in competing brand-name firms.

How Online Degrees Are Reshaping Competition in Higher Education

Online degrees are reshaping higher education by lowering tuition prices and reducing in-person program availability. In new research, Nano Barahona, Cauê Dobbin, and Sebastián Otero find that Brazil’s high online enrollment benefits those who need cheaper and more flexible options, but ultimately hurts young undergraduate students who are shifting away from higher-value in-person education options.

How Private Equity Is Quietly Rewriting the Rules of Professions

In new research, John M. Barrios and Inna Abramova show how private equity’s rising involvement in accounting and other professions is concentrating markets and breaking down barriers to conflicts of interest.

Why the SEC Needs to Require a Stricter Rule Book for Private Equity

In new research, Sureyya Burcu Avci, Cindy Schipani, and H. Nejat Seyhun assess and justify the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s failed attempts to regulate potential fraud and deception in the private equity market by examining the performance and potential conflicts-of-interest in de-SPAC transactions.

The Harmful Effects of “Good” Corporate Governance

In new research, Anat R. Admati, Nate Atkinson, and Paul Pfleiderer argue that when misconduct is profitable, enforcement mechanisms aimed at deterring corporate misconduct often fail to achieve their goals and they may even backfire. The reason is that corporations can adjust internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial compensation, to reduce or nullify the deterrent effects of corporate or managerial sanctions. These responses may lead to more misconduct and exacerbate social harm.

How Much Election News Do Americans Actually See on Their Phones?

Smartphones have become a primary gateway for consuming political news, but we know little about what individuals actually see on their phones. In new research, Guy Aridor, Tevel Dekel, Rafael Jiménez Durán, Ro’ee Levy, and Lena Song open the smartphone black box using novel content data and document individuals’ exposure to election-related content during the 2024 presidential election, as well as the drivers of this exposure.

The Bottom-Line Case for Better Workplaces

In new research, Mario Amore, Morten Bennedsen, Birthe Larsen, and Zeyu Zhao examine the symbiotic relationship between working environments and employee well-being, finding that when workers are safe and satisfied, companies profit.

Why Trade-Led Development Is Becoming Harder

In new research, Pinelopi Goldberg and Michele Ruta analyze how today’s structural, policy, and geopolitical trade conditions are no longer conducive to the trade-led growth miracles many developing countries experienced in the past.

EU’s Aggressive Labor Competition Policy Clashes with Judicial Reality and Benefits No-One

In recent research, Christian Bergqvist argues that the European Union’s approach to wage-fixing, no-hire, and no-poach agreements reveals a lack of nuance that may end up harming competition.

Latest news