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Carl Shapiro discusses the central role of economics in merger review under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Shapiro traces the evolution of merger law in response to advances in Industrial Organization economics over the past 50 years, highlighting how economic concepts and analysis are indispensable for predicting the likely competitive effects of proposed mergers.

Critics of industrial policy claim that state interventions into the market lead to inefficient subsidies, protectionism, or the “picking of winners.” Kartik Akileswaran and Rohan Sandhu argue that when industrial policy is instead viewed as an iterative, dynamic process between the private and public sectors, and undergirded by the state's capacity to play this role,  it leads to a more sophisticated understanding of industrial policy’s manifold historical manifestations and benefits.

Michael Jensen, a leading late 20th century economist, pivoted from praising public companies in the 1970s to assailing public company governance in the 1980s and 1990s. Disappointment that corporate executives did much to thwart takeover activity prompted Jensen’s 180-degree turn. 

At the heart of the government’s lawsuit against Apple is if the tech company’s practices of tying and refusing to deal truly enhance the performance and security of the iPhone and its ancillary services. The complaint indicates that the outcome of the case will be determined by the consumer welfare standard, writes Herbert Hovenkamp.

The answer is both. How so? The recent antitrust complaint against Apple heralds a pivotal shift in understanding the influence of tech giants on innovation in the digital realm. This article highlights three key takeaways. 

Randy Picker reviews the context of the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple and the questions of merit and the competitive obligations of dominant firms driving the case.

Fiona Scott Morton provides her initial thoughts on the Department of Justice’s lawsuit against Apple, how it compares to current and past tech cases, and the arguments she anticipates each side will make.

Henry Simons, one of the fathers of Chicago economics, advocated for libertarian policies promoting free markets as well as wealth redistribution through highly progressive income taxation, reflecting his belief that concentrations of private economic power were as threatening to liberty as centralized government power. Daniel Shaviro demonstrates that, for Simons and other early to mid-20th century libertarian thinkers, including Milton Friedman and George Stigler, policies promoting economic equality might be seen as complementary to, rather than conflicting with, support for free market capitalism and limited government intervention.

Drawing on new research, Oles Andriychuk identifies eight defining features of the European Union’s and United Kingdom’s new laws to regulate competition in digital markets that transform how we understand competition policy.

Eric Posner discusses why many antitrust professionals believe the law follows economic interpretation, despite the absence of economics in the relevant statutes. He argues that antitrust laws themselves have been resistant to adopting a coherent "economic theory" approach, leading to a tension between the economic views of agencies and academics versus the legal interpretations taken by courts.