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Regulatory Capture

When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.
“… as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler – The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)

Regulatory Capture

Implicit Government Involvement In The Puerto Rican Debt Crisis

Bob Chirinko
Why were Puerto Rico's economic and financial troubles not reflected in its bond yields prior to its 2016 default? A Stigler Center working paper...
Money in Politics

Is Liberal Democracy Doomed? A Q&A With Yascha Mounk

Asher Schechter
Mounk, author of the recent book The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger & How to Save It, talks to ProMarket about...
Regulatory Capture

Loose Policies Around Close Elections Highlight the Political Limits of Macroprudential Regulation

Karsten Müller
What can policymakers do to prevent future financial crises? An emerging consensus holds that so-called macroprudential regulation is key: policies that aim to mitigate...
Regulatory Capture

A Former Central Banker Tells Other Central Bankers: “Stay Away From Davos”

Asher Schechter
In an interview with ProMarket, former Bank of England deputy governor Sir Paul Tucker explains why the “unelected power” of central bankers threatens our...
Regulatory Capture

Livestreaming Polluters to Enforce Environmental Policy: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Pittsburgh

Nicholas Z. Muller
Enforcing environmental regulations is controversial and can be costly. But researchers at UCLA and Carnegie Mellon have proposed a low-cost alternative for enforcement—disclosing emissions...
Regulatory Capture

Does Direct Democracy Reduce Regulatory Capture?

Samantha Eyler-Driscoll
Does direct democracy make regulatory capture harder for industry? Samantha Eyler-Driscoll looks at a new Stigler Center working paper that examines state-level referenda and...
Regulatory Capture

Why Are So Many Executives Running for Office These Days?

Viktar Fedaseyeu
New research documents a sharp increase in the number of corporate executives in elected federal office between 1980 and 2014. But why do they...
Regulatory Capture

How Politicians Intensify Financial Cycles: 300 Years of Pro-Cyclical Regulation

Jihad Dagher
Three hundred years of financial regulation offer a cautionary tale to today’s push against yesterday’s regulations. This column revisits the political economy of financial...
Regulatory Capture

Rethinking Stigler’s Theory of Regulation: Regulatory Capture or Deregulatory Capture?

Steven K. Vogel
Much government regulation does not fit the logic of Stigler’s theory of anti-competitive regulatory capture. In a new book, Steven Vogel of Berkeley argues...
Regulatory Capture

The Only Game in Town: Central Banking as False Hope

Paul Tucker
To accompany Paul Tucker’s mini-course at the Stigler Center this week, we offer here an extract of the former Bank of England Deputy Governor’s...
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