Corporate Governance

Let Data Guide Legislation: Stifling Shareholders in the CHOICE Act?

In improving the current shareholder proposal process, legislators should trade the butcher knife for the scalpel.   What influence, if any, should shareholders have over...

A Small Step for Theory, a Leap Forward in Corporate Governance

Moving from shareholder value maximization to shareholder welfare maximization may be a small step in theory, but it could trigger a leap forward in...

Where Friedman Was Wrong

A new paper by Oliver Hart and Luigi Zingales argues that a company’s objective should be the maximization of shareholders’ welfare, not value.  In 1970,...

Does Empowering Shareholders Also Empower Special Interests?

The merits of increasing shareholder power are less obvious than reforms that increase companies' exposure to pressure from activist shareholders, since increasing shareholder power tends to...

Enhancing Competition? The Role of Governance in Increasing Exposure to Competition

Contemporary corporate governance reform has been a mixed bag: reforms that increase a company’s exposure to competition through the control market have been helpful,...

Does Whistleblowing Work?

Whistleblower reward laws work, and they work remarkably well. Congress, the executive branch of government, and the business community should enact, support, and nurture strong...

"The Connection Between Finance and Politics Has Been Under-Researched for Years"

Ahead of the Stigler Center's conference on the political economy of finance, we interviewed Stigler Center Director Luigi Zingales about the motivation behind the first-of-its-kind...

Are Managers Who Oppose Shareholder Proposals Acting in the Best Interest of Shareholders?

A new Stigler Center working paper finds that managers who resist shareholder proposals are typically acting responsibly, as opposed to acting on their own...

"Current Populist Discontent Seems Mainly Driven by a Fear of Change and Uncertainty"

In the final installment of ProMarket’s interview series on the economic theory of the firm, we ask Princeton University professor Alan Blinder and University of...

Experts: Financial Rewards and Protections Are the Best Way to Incentivize Whistleblowers

Stephen Kohn, executive director of the National Whistleblower Center: “If your white-collar crime detection program is based on nice people having high moral values,...

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Bethany McLean’s Weekend Reading List: Wirecard, Covid-Overwhelmed Hospitals, and Plastic

Corruption, lobbying, corporate malfeasance, and frauds: a weekly unconventional selection of must-read articles by investigative journalist Bethany McLean. 

“50 Years Later, It’s Time to Reassess”: Raghuram Rajan on Milton Friedman and Maximizing Shareholder Value

The biggest problem with shareholder value maximization is that it completely turns a tin ear to politics. The alternative is to maximize...

It Is Time to Move on From Friedman’s View of the Corporation

The anti-CSR position defended by Friedman would be acceptable only under conditions that have never been met by any real-world economy. Furthermore,...

Corporations Are Already Plenty Powerful. Stakeholder Capitalism Could Make Them More So

Encouraging corporations to further step into the role of governments and civil society groups by becoming more "socially focused" risks greater depreciation...

The Real Effects of Environmental Activist Investing

A new study examines the efficacy of climate-focused investor engagements initiated by the New York City Pension System. Its findings support the...

For Whom Corporate Leaders Bargained: What the Past Can Teach Us About the Questionable Promise of Implementing Stakeholder Capitalism Today

The debate about stakeholder capitalism should seek to learn from our experience with constituency statutes, which authorized corporate leaders to take into...

The Enduring Wisdom of Milton Friedman

Shareholder value maximization has been extremely successful globally in the way that matters most because, in many cases, maximizing shareholder value is...