Commentary

Carl Shapiro: Why Dropping Market Power from the Merger Guidelines Matters

Carl Shapiro provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Dennis Carlton: Have the Draft Guidelines Demoted Economics?

Dennis Carlton provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

European Digital Platform Regulation Risks Undermining Itself with Over-Centralization

Recent European digital regulation surrenders traditional key guideposts of European competition law and policy. The over-centralization of European Union antitrust authority and EU legislation risks undermining member state laws and competences. This may privilege platforms and eventually harm competition and consumers, writes Jörg Hoffmann.

Brazil’s CADE Demonstrates How Antitrust Authorities Can Pursue Sustainability Goals

Antitrust scholars and authorities are debating how antitrust can and should align with green sustainability initiatives. A recent ruling from Brazil’s antitrust authority, the Administrative Council for Economic Defense, in approving the launch of a commercial platform for agricultural commodity traders to track global supply chain sustainability metrics, presents one case study on how to advance sustainability goals without compromising competition.

Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale: Vertical Merger Enforcement in the Draft Merger Guidelines

Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale provide their round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

Herbert Hovenkamp: Competitive Harm and the 2023 Draft Merger Guidelines

Herbert Hovenkamp provides his round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

The Revised US Merger Guidelines Adopt the Future Markets Model

Since 1993 the American enforcers have claimed that they can directly protect firms’ competition to innovate. And the European Commission, which at first acknowledged that it protected competition in Future Markets, markets for products which do not exist yet, later claimed that it too can directly protect firms’ competition to innovate. In their new Revised Merger Guidelines the American enforcers now not only acknowledge that they protect competition in Future Markets, but say that they will do so aggressively. And since the Americans acknowledge that they protect competition in Future Markets the Europeans should do so as well—again.

Trinko Creep

Verizon Communications Inc. v. Trinko departed from the legal principles regulating refusals to deal under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The 2004 Supreme Court opinion also embedded an ideological preference for non-intervention that has spread to other areas of antitrust law, eroding its ability to deter anticompetitive conduct. On its own terms, however, there are opportunities to distinguish and constrain Trinko, writes Andrew I. Gavil.

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