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Regulatory Capture

When regulation protects narrow interests – usually the interests of the incumbent industry – at the expense of the public interest. Capture occurs in various ways: from straightforward bribes and threats, to more implicit quid pro quos such as the lucrative future employment (revolving door), to softer forms of cognitive/cultural capture.
“… as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated primarily for its benefit.” George Stigler – The Theory of Economic Regulation (1971)

Money in Politics

Family Ties as Corporate Power

Pablo Balán
Pablo Balán explains that family ties provide firms with an edge in collective action that enables them to be politically active through campaign donations, to engage in financial rent-seeking by obtaining subsidized state credit, and to bypass regulation seeking to curtail the influence of business by substituting individual contributions for corporate contributions. Scholars and advocates can benefit from a deeper understanding of organizational constraints to programmatic reform.
Commentary

Australian PwC Scandal Reeks of Regulatory Capture

Richard Holden
Accounting firm Price Waterhouse Cooper was recently forced to sell its government consulting business after using privileged information to help firms evade taxes. Richard Holden examines the scandal and explains why the response from the Australian Tax Office points to regulatory capture by the big 4 accounting firms.
Big Tech

How Big Tech Uses Net Neutrality To Subvert Competition

Roslyn Layton
A decade of evidence suggests that Open Internet policies have delivered the opposite effect.
News

Should We Regulate the Revolving Door of Regulators?

Elise S. Brezis
Is the revolving door of top regulators one of the reasons for a lack of good regulation? Based on her recent research, Elise Brezis...
Commentary

Corporate Political Responsibility in a Captured Economy

Claudine Schneider
Most attention on corporate governance has focused on businesses’ social responsibility. Claudine Schneider and Ed Dolan write that businesses need to take into account...
Commentary

A Directorship at a Federal Reserve Bank is Good News for Banks, but May be Bad News for the Fed

Renée Adams
Far before the collapse of SVB, I provided systematic evidence that banks appear to benefit from their directorships on Federal Reserve Banks. The fact...
Regulation

Letters that Matter: How Interest Groups Shape Financial Legislation

Renée Adams
Members of Congress are inundated with an avalanche of correspondence on a daily basis. But what persuades them to heed the call? Recent research...
Industrial Policy

Industrial Policy Is a Seductive Mirage

Michael C. Munger
Industrial policy was once so out of fashion that it was jokingly called “the policy that shall not be named.” Now it’s back in...
News

The Mechanisms of Regulatory Capture

Filippo Lancieri
To mark the 50-year anniversary of George Stigler’s seminal piece, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” we are publishing a new eBook examining his theory’s...
News

Fear of Punishment Distorts Bank Financial Reporting

Hamid Mehran
When bank employees are afraid of punishment from regulators, they are likely to conceal information about their faulty decisions. This in turn distorts the...
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The publication of the Stigler Center at The University of Chicago Booth School of Business

ProMarket is dedicated to discussing how competition tends to be subverted by special interests. The posts represent the opinions of their writers, not necessarily those of the University of Chicago, the Booth School of Business, or its faculty. For more information, please visit ProMarket Policy.