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Steven Salop

Steven Salop is a Professor of Economics and Law at the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC, where he teaches antitrust law and economics. His research and consulting focuses on antitrust, competition, and regulation. He has written numerous articles in various areas of antitrust and competition which take a modern “Post-Chicago” approach. These include a number of articles with various co-authors on the competitive effects of vertical mergers. Professor Salop has also written economics and law articles focused on various types of exclusionary conduct, monopolization, analysis of various aspects of horizontal mergers and joint ventures, facilitating practices, and role of decision theory in legal rulemaking. Professor Salop earned a BA degree at the University of Pennsylvania, Summa Cum Laude, and an M.Phil. and PhD in Economics from Yale University. Professor Salop has been honored with lifetime achievement awards from the AALS antitrust section and the American Antitrust Institute.
Antitrust and Competition

How the Illumina/Grail Opinion Updates Case Law on Vertical Mergers and “Litigating the Fix”

Steven Salop
Steven C. Salop analyzes the Fifth Circuit Court’s opinion accepting the Federal Trade Commission’s suit to block Illumina’s acquisition of Grail. The ruling sheds light on how courts may approach vertical merger analysis and “litigating the fix” in the future, and what this may mean for the Merger Guidelines’ approach to vertical mergers.
Antitrust and Competition

Merger Law Reaches Acquirer Incentives and Private Equity Strategies

Steven Salop
Steven C. Salop argues that Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the acquiring firm’s unilateral incentives and business strategy are likely to lessen market competition.
Antitrust and Competition

Revising Guideline 6 With Evidence To Establish a Structural Inference for Input Foreclosure

Steven Salop
Vertical merger law lacks the structural presumption of horizontal merger law, which shifts the burden from the government to the merging parties to provide evidence that a merger will not produce anticompetitive effects when it is known that the merger will substantially increase market concentration. To improve Guideline 6 of the draft Merger Guidelines concerning vertical foreclosure, Steven Salop develops a three-factor criteria with which the government antitrust agencies can show an analogous structural “inference” that shifts the burden of evidence to the merging parties.
Antitrust and Competition

Steven Salop: Burdens of Proof and Presumptions in the Merger Guidelines

Steven Salop
Steven Salop provides his round-two comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.
Antitrust and Competition

Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale: Vertical Merger Enforcement in the Draft Merger Guidelines

Steven Salop
Steven Salop and Jennifer Sturiale provide their round-one comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.
Antitrust and Competition

The Reasonable Competitive Conduct Standard for Antitrust

Steven Salop
The Stigler Center’s 2023 Antitrust and Competition conference seeks to answer the question: what lays beyond the consumer welfare standard? In advance of the...
Antitrust and Competition

An Excessive Evidentiary Burden Sunk the FTC’s Case Against the Meta/Within Merger

Steven Salop
In early February, a district court judge rejected the FTC’s preliminary injunction suit to block Meta’s purchase of Within, a developer of a virtual...
Antitrust and Competition

When Rhetoric Confronts Economic Reality: Unsupported Efficiency Claims and Unenforceable Promises Cannot Save the Book Publishers Deal

Bill Baer
In trying to get their merger approved, Penguin and Simon & Schuster claimed massive, but unverified cost savings. They also have promised that their...
Antitrust and Competition

The FTC Should Quickly Issue New Section 5 Enforcement Guidelines

Steven Salop
Unfair methods of competition are prohibited by Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act. The FTC has withdrawn the existing guidelines regarding...
Antitrust and Competition

Why Congress Should Pass the American Innovation and Choice Online Act

Fiona Scott Morton
The bill, which is the Senate is expected to vote on soon, would improve competition, increase innovation, benefit consumers, and provide the US with...
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