Filippo Lancieri

Filippo Lancieri is a Post-Doctoral Fellow at the ETH Zurich Center for Law & Economics and a Research Fellow at the Stigler Center. Filippo’s research explores the challenges associated with regulation of digital markets, with an emphasis on the enforcement of antitrust and data protection policies. He is trained as a lawyer and an economist and his academic and professional experience spans the US, Europe and Brazil. His work has been published or forthcoming in The University of Chicago Law Review, the Antitrust Law Journal, The Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, The Journal of Competition Law and Economics, and The Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, among others.

Rebuttable Structural Presumptions Improve Merger Review

In new research, Filippo Lancieri and Tommaso Valletti analyze the shortcomings of the current merger review system and defend stronger rebuttable structural presumptions as an important step forward.

The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the US

Why has antitrust enforcement declined in the United States since the 1970s? Is it due to the preferences of voters or business influence? In this symposium, Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, and Herbert Hovenkamp will discuss the findings of Eric Posner, Luigi Zingales and Filippo Lancieri’s new paper, “The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States.” Lancieri summarizes the findings of the paper here.

Lowering the Barriers to Entry for Economics Research in Healthcare

A new collection of scholarly work on the economics of the US healthcare sector is released today. The following is an adaptation of the...

Structuring a Structural Presumption for Merger Review

The consumer welfare standard can’t be saved with more theory. The problem is how it works in practice, and solving that means changing the...

How to Design Data Protection Laws That Actually Work 

More and more countries are passing data protection laws, yet empirical studies show that these laws rarely deliver on their promises. A new paper...

The Mechanisms of Regulatory Capture

To mark the 50-year anniversary of George Stigler’s seminal piece, “The Theory of Economic Regulation” we are publishing a new eBook examining his theory’s...

Designing Better Antitrust Remedies for the Digital World

Even when antitrust enforcers and courts get it right when finding an anticompetitive infringement, they constantly end up imposing remedies that are inadequate to...

Economic Regulation After George Stigler

George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation” has left a lasting impact on the academic and real-world practice of regulatory policy. Fifty years after...

Revisiting Ohio vs. American Express: It’s Time for a More Nuanced Approach to Market Definition

Nearly three years ago, the Supreme Court decided the case of Ohio vs. American Express, which turned out to be one of the most...

“A Loaded Weapon”: Francis Fukuyama on the Political Power of Digital Platforms

In an interview with ProMarket, Francis Fukuyama discusses the political threat posed by digital platforms and why he believes a “middleware” solution would be...

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