Francesco Trebbi

Francesco Trebbi is Professor of Business and Public Policy at the University of California Berkeley's Haas School of Business, Research Associate of the NBER, and a Research Fellow of CEPR. Dr. Trebbi focuses on the organization of nonmarket environments (government, special interest groups, military forces) and their interaction with the economy. This is an area of investigation that touches multiple fields within the economic discipline, from economic development to public economics, and within political science, from comparative politics to methods. He has worked on political institutions and their design in consolidated democracies and in autocracies, as well as on electoral campaigns and campaign finance, lobbying, housing and banking regulation, and public administration. His primary teaching interests are in political economy and applied economics more broadly. Professor Trebbi holds a PhD in Economics from Harvard University and was on the faculty of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business from 2006 to 2010 and the University of British Columbia from 2010 to 2020. He was also a Visiting Professor of Economics at Stanford University during 2017–18.

A New Approach to Measuring the Burden of Regulation

This research note employs the quantitative approach developed by Francesco Trebbi, Miao Ben Zhang, and Michael Simkovic (2023) to provide a descriptive overview of the main differences in costs of regulatory compliance across U.S. states for the year 2014 and over the period 2002-2014. These descriptive stylized facts can be useful in grounding extant discussion on regulatory compliance burden across different U.S. regions and over time and presents both unconditional results and results controlling for state industry composition.

Investing in Influence: Investors, Portfolio Firms, and Political Giving

A new paper examines the relationship between the rising concentration in institutional investors' ownership of publicly traded U.S. firms and portfolio companies' political giving....

“Comments for Sale”: Charitable Donations Can Lead Non-profits to Support Corporate Regulatory Agendas

A new paper shows how financial ties between companies and non-profits can subvert rulemaking process and lead to regulations that favor the interests of...

“Thank You and Farewell”: Francesco Trebbi on Alberto Alesina’s Intellectual Legacy

There are two main intellectual precursors of modern political economy in 20th Century: Social Choice and Public Choice. In founding modern political economy, Alberto...

From Politics to Macroeconomics and Beyond

Alberto Alesina’s curiosity and intellect led him to a research path that opened up entire fields of research and deepened our understanding of political...

The Political Footprint of Big Tech in Five Easy Charts

Big tech firms have been active in Washington since the early days of the Microsoft antitrust case, but in recent years they have increased...

When Taxpayers Subsidize Corporate Lobbying: How Firms Use Charitable Giving to Influence Politics

A new Stigler Center working paper examines a more roundabout way that companies can influence legislators: by donating money to charities in lawmakers’ districts....

The Big Picture: Clientelism, Plutocracy, and Democratization

Why is the electoral process not enough to rid nations of pathological political distortions such as cronyism and corruption?   This is the second installment of ProMarket’s...

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