Fiona Scott Morton

Fiona M. Scott Morton is the Theodore Nierenberg Professor of Economics at the Yale University School of Management. Her area of academic research is empirical industrial organization, with a focus on empirical studies of competition. Her published articles range widely across industries, from magazines, to shipping, to pharmaceuticals, to internet retailing, and are published in leading economics journals. From 2011-12 Professor Scott Morton served as the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, where she helped enforce the nation’s antitrust laws. At Yale SOM she teaches courses in the area of competitive strategy. She served as Associate Dean from 2007-10 and has won the School’s teaching award twice.

The Real Dish on the T-Mobile/Sprint Merger: A Disastrous Deal From the Start

The Trump-era DOJ’s decision to allow the T-Mobile/Sprint merger will go down as one of the worst merger-enforcement mistakes in decades. This...

Preventing Drug Shortages and Saving Lives: The Role of Quality and Reliability Standards

Prescription drug shortages have become more common in recent years, interrupting usual medical care and increasing patient risk and system costs, but...

How Will the Digital Markets Act Regulate Big Tech?

While the recently introduced Digital Markets Act rules might change prior to final approval, there is a lot to consider already. What...

Addictive Social Media: Why We Need Regulation and Competition for Digital Platforms

Social media is associated with the prevalence of mood disorders, depression, and anxiety. With no regulations to address the dangers of addictive...

Why a New Digital Authority Is Necessary

A recent Washington Post op-ed claimed that creating a digital authority to regulate Big Tech would be a disaster because of high costs and the...

Antitrust Alone Is Not Enough to Combat the Problems Associated With Digital Platforms

Digital platforms present an enforcement challenge sufficiently daunting that it requires major reforms to antitrust law. But in order to restore lost competition, we...

Why Behavioral Remedies Won't Work in the Case of AT&T-Time Warner

It is clear from the economics in the government’s complaint against the AT&T-Time Warner merger that the harms to competition articulated by the Department...

Perverse Market Incentives Encourage High Prescription Drug Prices

Pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs) are the under-discussed market participants who manage prescription drug insurance for the vast majority of Americans. PBMs claim to be a lone...

The Trump Tax

Will Donald Trump follow through on his populist campaign promises? The stock market can tell us a lot about the President-elect's economic policies.  President-elect Donald Trump broke...

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The New Challenges of Assessing Big Tech’s Impact

Big Tech firms are facing the biggest wave of antitrust legislation in their history. Academic literature reveals the complexity of possible consequences...

The Metaphysics of Regulatory Capture

Stiglerian capture and corrosive cultural capture, its left-leaning parallel, are ostensibly symbionts, two attempts at identifying impediments to keeping markets competitive by...

The Aristocracy of Talent: Business Intelligence

In the following excerpt from his new book, The Aristocracy of Talent: How Meritocracy Made the Modern World, Adrian Wooldridge traces "how universities...

Why Privacy Experts Need a Place at the Antitrust Table

Antitrust enforcers have tended to stay narrowly “in their lane,” failing to engage with how data is collected and used by digital...

Assessing George Stigler’s Economic Theory of Regulation

Despite its flaws and limitations, Stigler’s seminal article on the theory of economic regulation remains an important piece of scholarship worthy of...

“Old Chicago” and Freiburg: Why Ordoliberalism Was No “German Oddity”

Both the Chicago and Freiburg schools faced systemic fragility as the crucial property of societal orders. It was this fragility that served...

The Many Faces of Stigler’s Theory of Economic Regulation: Interest Group Politics Still Thrives—But Industry Often Comes Second

Stigler treats industry groups as the heavyweights in regulatory contests. But surprisingly often groups of farmers and workers knock them for a...