Eric A. Posner

Eric Posner is Kirkland and Ellis Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. His research interests include financial regulation, antitrust law, and constitutional law. He has written a dozen books and more than a hundred academic articles on law and legal theory. His most recent books are How Antitrust Failed Workers (Oxford University Press, 2021), Radical Markets (Princeton) (with Glen Weyl), which was named a best book for 2018 by The Economist; Last Resort: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Bailouts (Chicago), which was named a best book for 2018 by The Financial Times; and The Twilight of Human Rights Law (Oxford). He is of counsel at MoloLamken LLP, a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and a member of the American Law Institute.

Is Labor Antitrust a “Nonexistent” Problem?

In a recent revision of its Premerger Notification Regulation, the FTC removed labor market provisions from the previous draft as Commissioner Melissa Holyoak dismissed them as "a solution in search of a nonexistent problem." Eric Posner argues that her assessment contradicts a substantial body of academic research showing that labor market concentration is indeed a serious concern.

How Cultural Norms Help Companies Exploit Unpaid Workers

Eric Posner examines how businesses exploit cultural expectations to frame certain activities as non-work, creating a form of monopsony power that allows them to extract labor without compensation in areas ranging from college athletics to digital content creation. He argues that properly classifying these "invisible" forms of work as compensable labor would benefit society, challenging anti-commodification concerns and highlighting the law's struggle to define work in these blurred contexts.

Merger Review Should Incorporate a Role for Unions

Eric A. Posner argues that merger review would benefit from involving union representatives to protect labor interests.

The FTC Noncompete Ban Is Legal

Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner argue that the Federal Trade Commissions’ recent ban on noncompete clauses is lawful under the plain language of the Federal Trade Commission Act, longstanding court precedent, and well-established administrative law principles.

What Is the Role of Economics in Merger Review?

Eric Posner discusses why many antitrust professionals believe the law follows economic interpretation, despite the absence of economics in the relevant statutes. He argues that antitrust laws themselves have been resistant to adopting a coherent "economic theory" approach, leading to a tension between the economic views of agencies and academics versus the legal interpretations taken by courts.

Big Business’ Influence in the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement

Why has antitrust enforcement declined in the United States since the 1970s? Is it due to the preferences of voters, business influence, or an alternative explanation altogether? In this symposium, Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, and Herbert Hovenkamp discuss the findings of Filippo Lancieri, Eric Posner, and Luigi Zingales’ new paper, “The Political Economy of the Decline of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States.” In this article, Posner responds to the discussants' critiques and comments.

Eric Posner: The Role of Consumer Welfare in Merger Enforcement

Eric Posner provides his round-two comments on the draft Merger Guidelines.

The Whig History of the Merger Guidelines

A pervasive "Whig" view of United States antitrust history among scholars and practitioners celebrates the Merger Guidelines' implementation of increasingly sophisticated economic methods since their inception in...

Toward a Market Power Standard for Merger Review

The Stigler Center’s 2023 Antitrust and Competition conference seeks to answer the question: what lays beyond the consumer welfare standard? In advance of the...

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