Anat Admati
Anat R. Admati is the George G.C. Parker Professor of Finance and Economics at Stanford University Graduate School of Business (GSB), a Director of the GSB Corporations and Society Initiative, and a senior fellow at Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research. She is an economist with broad cross-disciplinary interests in the interactions between business, law and policy, and an advocate for better governance and accountability in the private sector and in government. She is also the author of The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton University Press, 2013).
Corporate Governance
George Stigler and the Challenge of Democracy
We are all victims of what George Stigler described as “the pervasive use of state support of special groups” and of governance...
Friedman 50 Years Later
Milton Friedman and the Need for Justice
Milton Friedman predicated his shareholder value maximization credo on the strong implicit and explicit assumptions that the rules of society protect stakeholders...
Academic Capture
Political Economy, Blind Spots, and a Challenge to Academics
Anat Admati calls on economists and academics to engage with governance and political economy issues, scrutinize models before applying them to the real world,...
Latest news
Antitrust and Competition
How the Rise of Labor Market Power Helps Explain the Fall of US Manufacturing Employment
A new working paper explores the increase in labor market power in the US and what’s driving it. It shows manufacturing workers...
Economic History Series
How Manufacturing’s Lobby Won and Lost its Political Influence
What happens when supporting capitalism hurts capitalists? Do business lobbies ever control the economy to the extent we think they do? The...
Antitrust and Competition
How Apple Locks Out the Competition with Its Digital Key
Apple’s efforts to dominate the contactless payments market and lock up the “digital key” space pose a profound threat to consumer privacy...
Antitrust and Competition
The Dawn of Antitrust and the Egalitarian Roots of the Sherman Act
While it isn’t particularly controversial that concentrated economic power was a legislative target of the Sherman Act, when read as a corollary...
Economic History Series
The Varied Ideologies—and Practices—of Socialist Nations in the Developing World
In an excerpt from his new book Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World, Harvard Business School professor Jeremy Friedman...
Corporate Governance
How Much Can We Trust Index Funds on Climate Change?
According to a theory that is gaining support among academics and practitioners, we should expect index fund managers to undertake the role...
Antitrust and Competition
The Ties that Bind Workers to Firms: No-Poach Agreements, Noncompetes, and Other Ways Firms Create and Exercise Labor Market Power
Collusive no-poach agreements are per se illegal, but noncompete clauses are not. Recent research casts doubt on the rationale for this legal...
