Hannah Pittock uses weight-loss company Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera to create a three-prong framework by which the antitrust agencies can identify when an invitation to exclude a rival from a market constitutes illegal exclusionary conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

Steve Salop explores the anticompetitive innovation behind weight-loss giant Novo Nordisk’s offer to acquire Metsera. Novo’s proposed contract presents a new tactic by which firms with market power can preclude rival mergers that will lead to procompetitive entry.

President Donald Trump has, across two administrations, sought to lower drug prices for Americans, most recently with executive order “Delivering Most-Favored-Nation Prescription Drug Pricing to American Patients.” Margherita Colangelo explains why his order is unlikely to accomplish its goal.

In new research, Benjamin Wood, Sven Gallasch, Nicholas Shaxson, Katherine Sievert, and Gary Sacks write that competition underenforcement and a narrow regulatory focus on prices and output has allowed industries that produce harmful consumer products, such as tobacco or ultra-processed foods, to increase demand and, consequentially, harm to society. They argue that competition law must evolve to consider health impacts.

In new research, John M. Barrios and Inna Abramova show how private equity’s rising involvement in accounting and other professions is concentrating markets and breaking down barriers to conflicts of interest.

Richard Wolfram explores the regulatory concerns of Netflix and Paramount’s competing merger proposals for Warner Bros. Discovery. Based on current antitrust doctrine and guidelines, Paramount would appear to face comparatively fewer barriers to the transaction, but the analysis is hardly black-and-white.

In new research, Sureyya Burcu Avci, Cindy Schipani, and H. Nejat Seyhun assess and justify the United States Securities and Exchange Commission’s failed attempts to regulate potential fraud and deception in the private equity market by examining the performance and potential conflicts-of-interest in de-SPAC transactions.

In new research, Anat R. Admati, Nate Atkinson, and Paul Pfleiderer argue that when misconduct is profitable, enforcement mechanisms aimed at deterring corporate misconduct often fail to achieve their goals and they may even backfire. The reason is that corporations can adjust internal governance mechanisms, particularly managerial compensation, to reduce or nullify the deterrent effects of corporate or managerial sanctions. These responses may lead to more misconduct and exacerbate social harm.