For decades, parts of the antitrust community have viewed private antitrust litigation skeptically, believing it is often frivolous or even inimical to robust federal antitrust enforcement. In new research, Filippo Lancieri argues that neither the law nor empirical evidence supports these claims and that private enforcement provides many positive social benefits to antitrust enforcement. One of the most important, and still under-explored, developments in United States competition policy in recent years has been the “rebirth” of private antitrust enforcement in...

COMMENTARY

The Dynamic Competition Framework Petit et al. Advocate Is Neither Pro-Enforcement nor Anti-Enforcement. It Doesn’t Exist

The dynamic competition school claims that competition authorities, by analyzing firms’ capabilities, can protect what this school calls dynamic competition.  Competition authorities, however, cannot adequately analyze firms’ capabilities. This school, therefore, lacks any framework which the authorities can use to analyze what they call dynamic competition. Any framework to protect dynamic competition, or what some call competition to innovate, must instead first identify the future products the competing firms are trying to make, writes Larry Landman.

RESEARCH

Should the First Amendment Protect Prosocial Cartels?

Advertiser boycotts, content moderation coalitions, and other forms of coordinated conduct increasingly pursue both commercial and social objectives, blurring the line between protected expression and unlawful collusion. In a new paper Madhavi Singh argues that extending First Amendment immunity to these “prosocial cartels” would undermine antitrust law and that they should instead be evaluated under the rule of reason.
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LATEST

The EU Commission’s Meta Decision on “Consent or Pay” Foregoes Competition for Data Privacy Law

In new research, Wolfgang Kerber argues that the European Union's decision to require a third option in Meta's "consent or pay" model focuses too heavily on user consent and ignores the broader goal in the Digital Markets Act of reducing gatekeeper advantages and increasing competition.

Call for 2027 Applications: The Stigler Center Affiliate Fellowship

The Stigler Center is seeking pre-tenure candidates for its Affiliate Fellows program. Applications are due January 22. You can apply here.

Competition Agencies Should Use Conditional Fines to Complement Behavioral Remedies That Age Poorly

In new research, Patrice Bougette, Frédéric Marty, and Simone Vannuccini propose that competition authorities add a conditional fine to antitrust cases that is activated when behavioral remedies are no longer effective.

Seeing Like a Supply Chain

The following is an excerpt from Seeing Like a Supply Chain by Miriam Posner, now out at Yale University Press.

SVB Shows Giving Growing Banks More Time To Meet Standards Comes With Risks

As banks grow, tiered regulation places them in stricter categories to address their greater risks. In new research, Pedro M. Batista finds that transition periods between tiers might delay when some higher standards become mandatory, potentially leaving growing banks exposed while known risks remain unresolved, as happened with Silicon Valley Bank. Federal Reserve reforms should address this gap between growing risks and delayed safeguards.

READING LISTS

Americans spend significantly more on health care than any other country. Why? Answers to this question range from hospital monopolies to perverse incentives to opaque pricing to medical licensing to pharmaceutical firms abusing IP practices to “creeping consolidation.” Why is the US health care system so broken? And what can antirust do about it? Catch-up on our coverage of antitrust and the US health care system.

Congress Has More Work to Do Before PBM Reform Reaches Consumers      

Jeremy Pilaar and Albert (Haotian) Wang present the weaknesses in current legislative reforms targeting pharmacy benefit managers. They suggest that lawmakers focus on reining in PBM income, limiting fees that PBMs can charge, and empowering state legislative efforts.  

The Prescription for Better Health Insurance? Competition.

Anticompetitive behavior, such as consolidation, in the health-insurance industry has allowed a small group of insurers to dominate the market. One of the main drivers of this behavior is “adverse selection,” where individuals know more about how sick they are than insurance companies do. To mitigate the risk of paying out more claims than they can cover, insurers often raise their premiums. Kellogg’s Amanda Starc and her colleague argue that, to create a truly healthy health-insurance marketplace, regulators and policymakers need a framework for rethinking the complex interactions between adverse selection and regulatory guardrails.

Antitrust as a Cure for the Private Equity Disease

The United States healthcare system has experienced an expansion of private equity ownership. In new research, Theodosia Stavroulaki argues that private equity acquisitions risk harming healthcare by increasing prices, reducing quality of care, limiting access to care, and hurting the labor force.

Pharma’s AI Boom Has Bet on the Wrong Bottleneck

Investors have poured billions into using artificial intelligence to discover new drugs, and 2026 is the first real test of whether AI-designed medicines actually helps patients. The boom has genuinely transformed the search for molecules — but that was never the costly, failure-prone part of making a medicine, and there AI has so far had little to add. Capital, and the public subsidies have not yet priced the difference, writes Michael A. Santoro.

George J. Stigler, one of the most influential economists of the 20th century, won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 1982 “for his seminal studies of industrial structures, functioning of markets, and causes and effects of public regulation.” His research upended the idea that government regulation was effective at correcting private-market failures. Stigler introduced the idea of regulatory capture, in which regulators could be dominated by special interests. These regulators would work for the benefit of large, monied organizations rather than the public good. Catch up on ProMarket's coverage of his legacy.

Finding a New Direction for the Common Good

Matt Lucky reviews Mariana Mazzucato’s new book The Common Good Economy: A new compass, now out at Basic Venture Group.

Top Scientific Research Is Globalizing, But Economics Is Becoming More Concentrated

Prizewinning research in most science-related academic fields has become less concentrated among institutions. However, as Richard B. Freeman, Danxia Xie, Hanzhe Zhang, and Hanzhang Zhou discuss in new research, prizewinners in economics continue to come from a narrow set of American institutions.  

The “Major Questions Doctrine” Precludes a Merger Efficiency Defense

For decades antitrust agencies, courts, and scholars have debated whether Section 7 of the Clayton Act permits an efficiency defense, in which merging firms can argue that enhanced efficiencies from the merger show that it does not reduce competition. However, the Supreme Court’s recent establishment of the “major questions doctrine,” which enforces or re-enforces a textualist reading of regulatory statues, undermines proponents of the efficiency defense, because the Clayton Act does not clearly and explicitly contain an efficiency defense. The “major questions doctrine” essentially acts as textualism on steroids,” writes Robert H. Lande.

Term-Limited Leaders Are More likely To Respond to Financial Crises by Helping Banks—and Themselves—Over the Public

Financial crises routinely trigger sweeping overhauls of financial regulation, but whose interests do these reforms serve? In new research, Orkun Saka, Yuemei Ji, and Clement Minaudier find that political leaders facing term limits are much more likely to respond to financial crises by introducing reforms that benefit banks over the public or long-term financial stability. This phenomenon occurs more frequently in countries where the revolving door between politics and finance is common.

Why Personalized Pricing Won’t Work the Way Critics Fear

Firms can now charge each shopper a different price, and regulators worry that the gains will flow from consumers to companies. But personalized pricing has two built-in limits: shoppers learn to hide how much they want things, and cheap purchases can be resold, writes Nursultan Mukhtaruly.

Bank Concentration Undermined the Fed’s Monetary Policy During the Last Tightening Cycle

In new analysis, Madhav Parikh examines how competition among banks in the United States shapes the way monetary policy reaches depositors. Tracking U.S. banks from late 2021 through mid-2026, he finds that banks in more concentrated local markets repriced their deposit interest rates less than banks in competitive markets, both as the Fed raised rates and as it cut them.

Private Enforcement of the DMA Brings Efficiencies yet Potential Disharmony

The Digital Markets Act establishes central rules and enforcement for digital platforms across the European Union, but allows decentralized private enforcement on the national level. In new research, Lena Hornkohl and Barbara Justen reflect on how two recent German court cases show how national litigation can make the DMA more effective, but also highlight the need for mechanisms that aid in consistent interpretation.

COLUMNS

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