Jeremy Pilaar and Albert (Haotian) Wang present the weaknesses in current legislative reforms targeting pharmacy benefit managers. They suggest that lawmakers focus on reining in PBM income, limiting fees that PBMs can charge, and empowering state legislative efforts.  

Anticompetitive behavior, such as consolidation, in the health-insurance industry has allowed a small group of insurers to dominate the market. One of the main drivers of this behavior is “adverse selection,” where individuals know more about how sick they are than insurance companies do. To mitigate the risk of paying out more claims than they can cover, insurers often raise their premiums. Kellogg’s Amanda Starc and her colleague argue that, to create a truly healthy health-insurance marketplace, regulators and policymakers need a framework for rethinking the complex interactions between adverse selection and regulatory guardrails.

The United States healthcare system has experienced an expansion of private equity ownership. In new research, Theodosia Stavroulaki argues that private equity acquisitions risk harming healthcare by increasing prices, reducing quality of care, limiting access to care, and hurting the labor force.

Investors have poured billions into using artificial intelligence to discover new drugs, and 2026 is the first real test of whether AI-designed medicines actually helps patients. The boom has genuinely transformed the search for molecules — but that was never the costly, failure-prone part of making a medicine, and there AI has so far had little to add. Capital, and the public subsidies have not yet priced the difference, writes Michael A. Santoro.

Jolted by the Great Depression of the 1930s, Thurman Arnold devised an anti-monopoly industrial policy for the United States Justice Department that breathed fresh life into a then-moribund Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Arnold’s jurisprudence built on Adam Smith’s discovery that market-making could promote national security and forestall civil unrest. Smith’s insights had informed the industrial policy of Alexander Hamilton, who laid the groundwork in the 1790s for the country’s economic development. Edward H. Levi brought Arnold’s pragmatic anti-monopolism to the University of Chicago. Here, ironically, Arnoldian jurisprudence would be transmogrified into the doctrinaire company-over-country market fundamentalism of the Chicago School of Economics. Today, writes Richard R. John, as we envision for the 21st century a new pro-market, pro-freedom, pro-national security industrial policy, it is worth recalling how U. S. economic development took the form that it did, why the Chicago School repudiated the enduring wisdom of Adam Smith, and what this portends for the world of today.

Henry Simons, the “Crown Prince” of the Chicago School and a professor in the economics department and the law school prior to World War...

Adam Smith’s theory of political economy did not begin with the isolated individual but rather the individual who operates to earn the respect of others. Wealth and freedom grew from these relationships and engaging with others to create a free society, or what 20th century philosopher Isaiah Berlin’s would call positive freedom. In the 1970s and ‘80s, the Chicago School abandoned this aspect of freedom in preference of the isolated individual, which in turn produced a weaker concept of freedom, morality, and society that has stifled the cultivation of all three in the United States, writes Maha Rafi Atal.

The connections between Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and Theory of Moral Sentiments reveal a much more complicated understanding of how markets work than developed in the common interpretation by the Chicago School of economics or that of its critics. Smith’s political economy based on commerce, sympathy, and competition produced social good but only when complemented and checked by other forces. When not checked, Smith worried about “factions” that produce bad outcomes, write Sandra J. Peart and David M. Levy.